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Nigerian Civil War and Britain’s Peace
Initiative, 1967–1970
Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde
The outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War few years after the attainment of independence
from Britain further deepened the interest of the latter in Nigeria’s existence as a na-
tion. Scholars of disciplines such as history, political science and international relations
through their works, have examined the nature and dimensions of Nigeria’s relations
with Britain as well as the British involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. Foreign policy
formulation, colonial legacies, economic ties, are typical examples of the nature of Nige-
ria’s relations with Britain. Similarly, scholars have interrogated the roles of Britain in
the Nigerian Civil War through multilateral efforts at the United Nations and Common-
wealth of Nations, propaganda, protection of the British economic interests in Nigeria,
British military initiative as well as the pressure of the Cold War as the basis for prompt
British intervention in the war. However, comprehensive intellectual attention has not
been paid to the British peace initiative outside the multilateral conflict resolution struc-
ture. It is against this backdrop that this paper interrogates the nature and dimension
of British peace initiative strategy which brought an end to the Nigerian Civil War. The
paper argues in its conclusion that the failure of the multilateral approach of the British
was salvaged by the unilateral British bureaucratic strategy that was enhanced by their
colonial legacies in Nigeria.
[Nigeria; Great Britain; Peace; Civil War]
Introduction
War according to Sir Robert Phillimore, is the exercise of the interna-
tional right of action and a necessary tool of statecraft if waged for
specific political objectives.1 It can be defined as a struggle among po-
litical units, within and between states, involving organized fighting
 University of Ibadan, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Ibadan, Nigeria.
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1 R. PHILLIMORE, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. III. Philadelphia 1854,
p. 99.
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forces, and resulting in a sizeable number.2 The concept of war accord-
ing to von Clausewitz is an unlimited use of violence as well as unre-
strained use of force to attain political goal in the service of the state.3
War is a means for achieving a particular end as well as instrument of
statecraft, a tool which can be used for different purposes which could
either be good or bad while the purposes could be used in uplifting a
people and righting the wrongs of the past while creating a new social
order that would enable the people involved to live happily.4 It can be
used to either resist domination or to effect the conquest or domina-
tion of others in just and unjust manners.5
From the foregoing, war can be defined as an escalation of conflict. It
can be seen as fierce contestation for power, influence and spacewithin
a state and between two or more sovereign states. It’s a process that
transmutes from mere conflict between two or more contending pow-
ers within and outside a state to armed conflict. War manifests when
there is a breakdown of communication channel between or among
parties to conflict. Globally, wars had been fought between or among
nations regionally and internationally while wars were equally fought
in different parts of globe within states. For instance, the Napoleonic
Wars of 1799 to 1815 and the Crimean War of 1854 to 1856 were wars
fought mainly in Europe as a region among the European powers
such as Austria, Great Britain, France, Russia and Prussia. The Austro-
Prussian War of 1866, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and First and Second Balkan Wars of 1911
and 1912 are examples of wars fought between and among nations.6
The outbreak of the First and Second World Wars in 1914 and 1939
respectively opened a new vista in the history of warfare globally. It
must be stated that the outbreak of wars is not restricted to escalated
conflict situations between or among countries of the same region and
countries of different regions, wars manifest within countries in dif-
ferent parts of the globe. For example, the American civil war of 1861
2 T.A. COULOUMBIS – J.W. WOLFE, Introduction to International Relations Power and
Justice, New Jersey 1990, p. 181.
3 K. von CLAUSEWITZ, On War, New York 1943, pp. 595–596.
4 T. ADENIRAN, Introduction to International Relations, Lagos 1982, p. 123.
5 See: Q.W. MILLS, The Causes of War Three, New York 1958.
6 See: A.WOODS, Europe Since 1815, London 1964. See also: H. L. PEACOCK,AHistory
of Modern Europe, 1789–1981, London 1958.
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to 1865, the Spanish War of 1936 and the Lebanese civil war of 1975 to
1990.7 In Africa, warswere fought to resist foreign domination. A good
example of this was the Algerian war against the French in the 1960s
before the attainment of independence of the former. Countries such
as Angola, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde engaged the Portuguese in
armed conflicts that degenerated into war in the 1970s.
After the attainment of independence of most African states in the
decades of 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, internal squabbles and fierce
contestation for power among political gladiators of various African
states created a situation for political instabilities that snowballed into
civil wars. For instance, the civil war which broke out in Liberia in
1989, the civil of 1991 in Somalia, the Algerian civil war of 1992 and
the civil war which broke out in Sierra Leone in 1992.8 The political
instabilities which enveloped Burundi and Rwanda in 1994 and later
degenerated into civil wars formed major headlines in the continent
and the entire globe due to the historically unprecedented genocide
that accompanied these wars, especially that of Rwanda. The sensitiv-
ity of civil war makes scholars like Couloumbis and Wolfe to assert
that civil war develops out of failure of a national political system and
its institutions to function effectively. In this condition of institutional
collapse according to them, significant sections of the population, in-
cluding major factions of the elite, no longer accord those in power, or
even the regime they represent, a sense of legitimacy.9 Thus, literature
abounds on theNigerian civil war in terms of genocide,10 international
politics,11 involvement of European and Asiatic powers,12 perception
7 See also: A. ADEOGUN, The United States from Colony to Nationhood, Lagos 2003. See
also: N. LOWE,Mastering Modern World History, London 1982.
8 See also: J. A. S. GREENVILLE, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century, Vol. II,
Harvard 1997; M. MEREDITH, The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Indepen-
dence, London 2005.
9 COULOUMBIS – WOLFE, p. 205.
10 K. E. SMITH, The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra, in: Journal of Genocide Research, 16,
2–3, 2014, pp. 247–262; see also: L. HEERTEN, The Nigeria-Biafra War: Post-Colonial
Conflict and the Question of Genocide, in: Journal of Genocide Research, 16, 2–3, 2014,
pp. 169–203.
11 J. J. STREMLAU, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970, Prince-
ton 1977.
12 J. O. AKINBI, Exploring the Roles Played by Some European and Asiatic Powers
during the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970, in: International Journal of Humanities and
Social Science, 5, 8, 2015, pp. 151–155.
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of international actors,13 oil politics,14 revolution,15 economic impact
on Nigeria,16 and foreign business interests.17
This paper focuses on Britain’s peace initiative and the Nigerian
civil war starting from 1967 when the war broke out to 1970 when the
war ended. The study notes that discussions on the history of Nige-
rian civil war have been centered around the interplay of forces within
and outside Nigeria. In this way scholars have paid adequate attention
to how various actors within and outside Nigeria protected their in-
terests during the war to the exclusion of the British peace initiative
outside the multilateral peace agenda of the international actors. The
conventional wisdom on the subject matter of the Nigerian civil war
places emphases on oil politics, social disorder, political instability, for-
eign interests, ethnicity, struggles for superiority within the military
hierarchy, impact of the cold war politics and the quest for sustained
relations between Nigeria and Britain.18
However, Oladapo Fafowora, drawing on the strength of British
diplomatic intervention in the Nigerian civil war challenged the con-
ventional wisdom by maintaining that Britain chose to intervene in
the war through Commonwealth Secretariat in London behind the
13 M.S. AUDU – O. UZOMA – I. B. ISSAC, Contextualizing the International Dimen-
sions of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970, in: American Journal of Contemporary Re-
search, 3, 8, 2013, pp. 112–117.
14 Ch. UCHE, Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War, in: The Journal of African
History, 49, 1, 2008, pp. 111–135.
15 F.A. JAMES, The Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970: A Revolution?, in: African Journal of
Political Science and International Relations, 5, 3, 2011, pp. 120–124.
16 U.P. ONUMONU– P.O. ANUTANWA, Rethinking the Impact of Nigerian CivilWar:
Commerce in the Post Civil War Nnewi and Its Challenges, 1970–2000, in:Mgbakoiba
Journal of African Studies, 6, 2, 2017, pp. 155–167.
17 A. RAJI – T. S ABEJIDE, Oil and Biafra: AnAssessment of Shell BP’s DilemmaDuring
the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970, in: Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and
Management Review, 2, 11, 2013, pp. 15–32.
18 UCHE, pp. 111–135. See: K. OMOTOSHO, Just Before the Dawn, Ibadan 1988. See also:
J. A. S. GREENVILLE, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century. Vol. II, Harvard
1997; T. ADENIRAN, Nigeria and Great Britain, in: A. B. AKINYEMI – S.O. AGBI –
A.O. OTUBANJO (eds.),Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty Five Years. Vol. X.
International Relations, Ibadan 1989; S.O. AGBI, The Organization of African Unity and
African Diplomacy, 1963–1979, Ibadan 1986; SMITH. See also: I. OKORO, Ndi Igbo of
the South-East: Centenary Glimpses, in: S.U. FWATSHAK – O. AKINWUMI (eds.),
The House that ‘Lugard Built’ Perspectives on Nigeria’s First Centenary: The Pains, the
Gains and the Agenda for the Future, Jos 2014.
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scenes.19 Kaye Whiteman corroborates this evidence by arguing that
the initial British reaction to the 1967 Biafran secession, led by Colonel
Emeka Ojukwu, was muted by the British leadership.20 In a similar
vein, S.O. Agbi notes tangentially that British inability to intervene
in the war effectively through the Commonwealth manifested due to
rigid positions of both the Nigerian and Biafran governments.21 Apart
from Fafowora, Whiteman and Agbi’s analyses that examine the mul-
tilateral approach of the British intervention in the Nigerian civil war,
extant studies have not paid adequate attention to the unilateral and
comprehensive British peace initiatives outside the multilateral inter-
national peace efforts.
This neglect reduces our comprehensive understanding of British
intervention in the Nigerian civil war. The main thesis is to demon-
strate that British intervention in the war outside the multilateral
peace initiative assisted greatly in undermining the intervention of
various international actors whose involvement in the war complexi-
fied dimensions which the war took. This is because British involve-
ment reduced these complexities as it complemented the international
efforts that were initiated through multilateral peace initiatives. It is a
contribution to the study of Nigerian civil war and moves discussion
in new directions. The study is divided into four sections. The first
deals with introduction, Nigeria’s post-independence political crises
and the outbreak of war, the challenges and success of British peace
initiatives in the Nigerian civil war and the conclusion.
Nigeria’s Post-Independence Political Crises and the Outbreak of
War
TheNigeria’s post-independence political crises could be traced to un-
controlled profligacy of the pioneer leaders of Nigeria as a new na-
tion. The unquenchable taste for primitive accumulation necessitated
the need for fierce contestation for power in the regions as well as the
19 O. FAFOWORA, Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy. A Comparative Study
of British Attitudes and Policy towards Secessionist Moves in Congo (1960-
–1963) and in Nigeria (1966–1969), Ibadan 1990, p. 106.
20 K. WHITEMAN, The Switchback and the fallback Nigeria-Britain Relations, in:
A. ADEBANJO – A.R. MUSTAPHA (eds.), Gulliver’s Troubles Nigeria’s Foreign Pol-
icy after the Cold War, KwaZulu-Natal 2008, p. 259.
21 S.O. AGBI, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, 1963–1979, Ibadan
1986, p. 63.
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central government in Lagos, the country’s capital by the three ma-
jor political parties that is, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), Na-
tional Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Action Group (AG).
These three political parties were formed along ethnic lines without
any of them possessing pan-Nigerian outlook.22 The NPC, NCNC and
AG were dominant in the North, South Eastern part and South West-
ern part of the country respectively. The dominance of their respective
regions was perpetuated by the major ethnic groups as this laid the
foundation of contradiction of Nigeria’s post-independence political
structure.
An additional component of this contradiction was the existence
in all the three regions of ethnic minorities which served as a poten-
tial nursery for conflict within the regions while the Nigerian leaders
did not find it politically expedient to integrate these ethnic minorities
into the political structures of their regions.23 Since three parties repre-
sented largely the majority groups of Nigerians, especially Nigerians
of Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba ethnic stock, political powers were equally
shared by the politicians of these ethnic stocks without considerable
sense of belonging to the ethnic minorities. The sustenance of this po-
litical dominance meant that these political parties also erected struc-
tures of economic dominance through the planting of business inter-
ests of politicians in these regions in banks, businesses and financial
structures set up by these parties in their respective regions in order to
achieve their political objectives.24
By implication, these political parties dominated by major politi-
cians of major ethnic groups in the country moved quickly to amass a
fortune from public funds large enough for them to be able to win the
next election.25 For example, the Action Group government in Nige-
ria’s Western Region in 1962 invested about £6.5 million in the Na-
tional Investment and Properties Company, a business which had four
party leaders as its directors while one of the directors donated £3.7
22 See: R. L. SKLAR, Contradictions in Nigerian Political System, in: Journal of Modern
African Studies, 3, 2, 1965, pp. 201–213. See also: R. L. SKLAR, Nigeria Political Parties,
Princeton 1963.
23 FAFOWORA, p. 18.
24 M. MEREDITH, The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence, London
2005, p. 174.
25 Ibidem.
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million to the Action Group Party in the form of special donations.26
Northern politicians exhibited similar profligacy as these political
gladiators in the North served as the greatest beneficiaries of thirty-
nine investments and loan projects of the Northern Nigeria Develop-
ment Corporation during the First Republic.27 The dominance of the
political-economy of the regions by the politicians of the three major
groups further heightened tension in these regions as this reverber-
ated at the center though fierce contestation for the control of the cen-
tral government by the three major parties.
This contestation was further accentuated by the insatiable attitude
of the country’s political gladiators and their parties in the accumula-
tion of wealth for the purposes of strategic positioning at the center. It
was this struggle for strategic positioning at the center, especially be-
tween the NPC-NCNC federal government and AG as the opposition
party that further worsened the already tensed political atmosphere in
the country. These political dialectics between the ruling parties and
the AG as the opposition reached their crescendo in the late 1962 and
early 1963 when the AG as a party became highly polarized through
the struggle for the soul of the party between Chief Obafemi Awolowo
the leader of AG and the opposition leader in Federal House of Rep-
resentatives Lagos and Chief Akintola, the Deputy Leader of AG and
Premier of the Western Region.28
The internal division within the AG further made it vulnerable to
suppression by the NPC led federal government as Awolowo and his
loyalists who were not in the good books of the federal government
were convicted for treason in September 1, 1963.29 The year 1964 ush-
ered in crises that accompanied the federal elections of that year. As
argued earlier, the three dominant political parties stifled all apposi-
tions in their respectively regions. In the Western Region, no oppo-
sition political parties were allowed to campaign except that of Pre-
mier Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) while
NCNC and NPC had no rivals in the eastern and northern regions
26 Ibidem.
27 Ibidem.
28 A. ADEMOYEGA, Why We Struck. The Story of the First Nigerian Coup, Ibadan 1981,
pp. 12–13.
29 Ibidem, p. 15.
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respectively.30 The outcome of the federal election further strength-
ened the position of the ruling NPC and NCNC led government de-
spite nationwide boycott by political parties such as United Progres-
sive Grand Alliance (UPGA) in the North and AG that had become the
opposition party due to its dwindling fortunes in West.31
More than that, the imbroglio which followed the outcome of the
elections of 1964 further legitimized the illegality perpetrated by the
ruling NPC-NCNC led government through rigging that did not stop
Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the country’s President from forming a coalition
government. This unfortunate political scenario has been described by
Fafowora as unequal distribution of power at the center and lack of
political and economic equilibrium between Northern and Southern
Nigeria.32 This lack of political equilibrium prepared the ground for
political gloom in the country especially in the Western Region and
other parts of the country. The dancing of the country on the brink no
doubt necessitated military intervention in politics as this filibustered
the country’s nascent democracy in January 1966.
With the military intervention in the country’s politics in January
1966, uncertainties further enveloped the political atmosphere due to
ethnic interpretation given to the coup. Any keen observer of Nigeria’s
politics would not hesitate to conclude that it was an Igbo dominated
coup as the emergence of General Aguiyi Ironsi, the most senior mili-
tary officer in the Nigerian Army an Igbo further exacerbated the com-
plicated political situation. This feeling of political insecurity of the
northern oligarchy necessitated the counter-coup of July 1966 as the
Western Region Governor, Col. Adekunle Fajuyi and General Ironsi
were gruesomely murdered in coup that was perceived as northern
orchestrated coup.
As the coup produced Gen. Yakubu Gowon, a northerner as the
Head of State, the political atmosphere in the country became suf-
ficiently charged such that lives and properties of the Igbo people
were destroyed while some reprisals took place in the East.33 In the
30 B. IGE, People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940–1970), Ibadan 1995, p. 255.
31 Ibidem, pp. 256–257.
32 FAFOWORA, pp. 18–19.
33 I. OKORO, Ndi Igbo of the South-East: Centenary Glimpses, in: S.U. FWATSHAK
– O. AKINWUMI (eds.), The House that ‘Lugard Built’ Perspectives on Nigeria’s First
Centenary: The Pains, the Gains and the Agenda for the Future. Jos 2014, p. 94.
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midst of this political uncertainties, the Eastern Region Governor Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu saw himself as the protector of the rights of the
Igbo people throughout the country as he was not too pleased with
the deteriorating security situation in the country especially on mat-
ters that concerned the Igbo people in the North. The apparent lack of
unity in the country in Ojukwu’s estimation created a wedge between
him and Gowon. The tension between the two leaders was further
compounded by the creation of twelve state by Gowon in May 1967 as
this left Ojukwu with no choice than to declare the Republic of Biafra
as a secessionist region on the May 27, 1967 as these declarations of
Gowon and Ojukwu led to the country’s civil war.
The Challenges and Success of British Peace Initiatives in the
Nigerian Civil War
The outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in July 1967 was given differ-
ent interpretations by the keen observers, especially outside Nigeria as
these interpretations were shaped by the convictions and interests of
these observers. The civil war from the perspective of the Muslim na-
tions like Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Sudan was an affront
on the part of the Christian dominated Eastern Nigeria against the fed-
eral government of Nigeria led by the Muslim North.34 The outbreak
of the war from the perspective of a country like Ethiopia was strictly
political as the Ethiopians believed that Biafra secession bid could pre-
pare the ground for the disintegration of the Ethiopian nation that
was resisting the Eritrean secessionists.35 The reactions of the keen ob-
servers in the international community were diverse depending on
where their interests lied. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
for instance, believed that further secessionist movements could cre-
ate unbearable political instability in the continent. This explains why
Ghana a member of OAU, under the leadership of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ankrah made frantic diplomatic efforts at reconciliation between
Ojukwu and Gowon few months before the war broke out.36
It is reasonable to state that the thinking of Ghana as a member of
OAU conformed to the quest for peace and security of the African
34 O. AGBI, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, 1963–1979, Ibadan
1986, p. 59.
35 Ibidem, p. 60.
36 OMOTOSHO, p. 276.
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continent as espoused in the OAU Charter. For the British, allowing
their former colony which was the largest colony in Africa as well as
the largest black nation in the world after independence to disinte-
grate could disintegrate their legacies. It must, however, be stated that
the British unilateral peace initiative during the war was intrinsically
linked to her economic interests in Nigeria since the independence of
the later in 1960. By 1965 for instance, the value of British exports
to Nigeria was £88m, a third of Nigeria’s total imports.37 The neo-
colonial nature of the Nigerian economy, especially the private com-
mercial sector was dominated by British-owned enterprises38 while
the totality of British investment in Nigeria before the war stood at
£200m representing 53 percent of total foreign investments in Nige-
ria.39
The outbreak of the war in 1967 naturally threatened the British
business interests in Nigeria and this necessitated the need for early
British intervention in the war. For instance, the failure of the British
government to convince General Gowon led federal government not
to erect oil blockade against Shell, an imminent blockade which em-
anated from the latter’s readiness to pay £250,000 to Biafra40
convinced the British that the disintegration of Nigeria would create
economic dilemma for the British investments in Nigeria. This immi-
nent economic uncertainty coupled with the strategic move of Russia
towards the federal government in terms of arms supplies spurred
Britain into diplomatic action in the Nigerian war.41 The diplomatic
move of the British was strategically designed to achieve two objec-
tives. First, to neutralize Soviet strategic incursion into the economic
space of the Nigerian nation. Second, to further consolidate British
economic tentacles in Nigeria. The quest for achieving these objec-
tives created anxiety in London. The need to douse this anxiety led
to a memo written by the British Parliamentary and Under-Secretary
of State in the Commonwealth inquiring about the extent of safety of
37 See: Commonwealth Trade, 1970, published by the General Economic Division of the
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1971.
38 See: A.G. FRANK, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York 1969.
39 See: Economic and Financial Review, Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, July 1965, pp.
8–11.
40 FAFOWORA, p. 98.
41 WHITEMAN, p. 259.
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British industries and business interests in Nigeria especially in the
Eastern region.42
The British government also inquired about the readiness of the fed-
eral government to protect British investments in Nigeria and subse-
quently got an assurance from the Nigerian government through the
Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo at a meeting held
in London with Commonwealth representatives and British business-
men.43 It seems probable to state that the British unwavering diplo-
matic manoeuvrings in Nigeria were largely borne out of the need to
shield their economic presence in Nigeria not the quest for the dis-
mantling of communist threat in Nigeria for the overall interests of
the capitalist West. This economic objective has been buttressed by
Chris Brown when he asserts that the well-being of any government
largely depends on the success of its economic management and this
success cannot be achieved in isolation without the effective monitor-
ing of economic interests of that nation in the global economic arena.44
This effective monitoring is a fundamental policy choice that guar-
antees the survival45 of a nation in global economic environment. The
quest for this survival compelled the British to exert pressure on the
Nigerian government on the need to proffer political solution to the
crisis as this led to the historic meeting of the two sides in Kampala
Uganda from May 23–30, 1968.46 The Kampala meeting was chaired
by the Commonwealth Secretary General Mr. Arnold Smith and
Uganda’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Sam Okada as they tried vehemently
hard to bring the delegates of the two sides together in order to bring
the conflict to an end.47 This effort however, did not materialize be-
cause the delegates from Biafra demanded for a ceasefire before talks
while the federal government representatives insisted that some con-
ditions must be laid down before ceasefire.48 The rigid stance of both
parties led to temporary collapse of the British diplomatic efforts in
42 Britain Votes Faith in Federal Government, in: Daily Times, April 13, 1968, p. 10.
43 Ibidem.
44 Ch. BROWN, Understanding International Relations, New York 1997, p. 141.
45 Ch.A. ALADE, Theories, Concepts and Principles in the Study of International Relations,
Lagos 1997, p. 69.
46 FAFOWORA, p. 106.
47 Ceasefire Problem Stalemate at Peace Talks, in: Daily Times, May 30, 1968, p. 1.
48 Ibidem.
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Kampala. As the secessionists began to lose territory and access to
sea, they intensified one of the most outstanding media campaigns
of the 20th century as this further galvanized support for them from
Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia and Haiti within and outside
Africa.49
The recognition of the Biafra propaganda carried with it criticisms
of the British government as this further intensified the nervousness
of Britain while the supplying of arms became a deep trauma.50 This
dilemma made their support in terms of arms supply to Nigeria am-
bivalent. The British during their hesitation and perplexity incurred
the reaction of the Nigerian government. In one of the interviews
granted to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London,
Nigeria’s Federal Commissioner for Information and Labor, Anthony
Enahoro admonished the British government on the importance of its
support given to Nigeria in terms of arms and that the abandonment
of that support could jeopardize British interests in Nigeria when the
country looked elsewhere for support.51 Enahoro’s comment attested
to the readiness of the Nigerian state likewise other third world coun-
try to exploit to the fullest the rivalry between the two ideological
blocs of the Cold War in local conflict around the globe as expressed
by the American policy makers.52 Initially, the British appeared unde-
terred about this subtle threat from Nigeria. This was connected with
how the Biafra propaganda had moved world opinions behind the
plight of the Ibos and this made the British to thread it softly as far as
their arms supply was to Nigeria was concerned. Nigeria on the other
hand was not disserted within and outside Africa. For Instance, the
unflinching support demonstrated by the Togolese government when
it intercepted an aircraft carrying Nigerian notes that were believed to
belong to the secessionists who were trying to change these old notes
to the new ones introduced by the Nigerian government.53 The fed-
eral government under the leadership of Gowon changed these notes
49 WHITEMAN, p. 260.
50 Ibidem.
51 UK Arms Ban Will Not Halt War, in: Daily Times, June 8, 1968, p. 1.
52 NND/969000/. Memorandum from the Director, United States Arms Control and
Disarmament, William C. Foster to Mr Benjamin H. Read on Issues related to United
States Stance on Arms Control and Disarmament, November 22, 1968, p. 2.
53 Rebel Cash Deal Costs Nigeria £700,000, in: Daily Times, June 21, 1968, p. 1.
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to prevent the secessionists from using the old currency for arms pur-
chase.
Another example was the increase in Nigerian trade with the So-
viet Union as the latter supplied arms such as 122-MM guns, Kalash-
nikovs, 107-MM recoilless rifles and Soviet Cars such as Lada, Mosko-
vitch and Volga.54 Soviet’s supply of arms confirmed the fear of the
British and the Americans about the long term strategy of Russia to ex-
ploit every opportunity capable of weakening the West through arms
supply to the stronghold of the West during conflict.55 The unprece-
dented economic intercourse necessitated by the British unstable at-
titude forced London to renew its support for Nigeria through arms
supply as well as effective monitoring of peace talks in Ethiopia. Al-
though the peace talk in Ethiopia was initiated by the Consultative
Committee of the OAU,56 the British monitored the talks with keen in-
terests. In one of themeetings between Anthony Enahoro and Britain’s
Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Shepherd in Lon-
don, the British inquired from the Nigerian government the state of
the Ethiopian peace talks and equally prevailed on Nigeria on the pos-
sibility of allowing relief materials to reach the civilian population in
Biafra.57 The British request appeared as a kind of pressure on Nigeria
to reverse its policy on relief supplies.58
Though the Addis Ababa peace talks produced a forlorn hope for
peace, it would be wrong to assume that it was a dismal failure be-
cause it further gave the British the impetus to intervene in the Nige-
rian civil war on two fronts. First, the supply of arms. Second, the
failure of Addis Ababa talks further placed diplomatic responsibili-
ties on the shoulder of the British. These scenarios appear irreconcil-
able but the British bureaucracy, as a matter of necessity realized the
importance of preventing the disintegration of their former colony as
this compelled them to sustain their obligation of arms supply on the
one hand, while lack of quick diplomatic solution to the war could
54 ADENIRAN, Nigeria and Great Britain, p. 36.
55 NND019006/. Department of State Policy Planning the Further Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: Problems of the West, February 1966, p. 7.
56 AGBI, p. 64.
57 Enahoro Lord Shepherd Discuss Nigeria, in: Daily Times, August 20, 1968, p. 12.
58 Anthony Enahoro Holds Talks with British Government Officials, in: Daily Sketch,
August 20, 1968, p. 1.
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aggravate the effects of Nigeria’s offensive against Biafra. The British
anxiety about the effects of their arms supply to Nigeria was further
heightened through the statement made by General Gowon in an in-
terview that the federal troops will intensify their offensive against
Biafra rebels and that victory was certain in four weeks.59
This statement created a feeling of hysteria from the British public
towards Nigeria. One of such anti-Nigerian sentiments in Britain was
expressed in a letter written by oneMr. Edward Taylor, a Conservative
member of the British House of Commons to Commonwealth Secre-
tary, George Thomson demanding that the House of Commons should
re-convene to discuss and review British supply of arms to Nigeria.60
These anti-Nigerian sentiments appeared to have put the British gov-
ernment on the spot because pressure mounted on the government
left it with no choice than to invite Anthony Enahoro, Nigeria’s Com-
missioner for Information through the British Minister of State in the
Commonwealth Office, George Thomson about the implication of the
statement credited to Gowon.61 Sensing the importance of the British
support to the Nigeria’s war effort, the Nigerian government was able
to convince the British that the statement credited to the Nigerian
Head of States did not in any way violate the laid down conditions
of the British government concerning the sales of arms to Nigeria.62
It seems reasonable to argue that the British government was suffi-
ciently convinced based on the response of the Nigerian government.
One may equally posit that the unflinching support of the British to
Nigeria did not dissuade the British public from mounting pressure
on the government to reconsider its position on arms supply to Nige-
ria. The British government on the other hand appeared to be con-
vinced about its strategic involvement in the Nigerian civil war. A
pointer to this scenario was the support given by the American gov-
ernment through its Assistant Secretary of State for African Affair,
Joseph Palmer in October 1968 that the British policy of maintaining
her traditional arms supply to Nigeria should not be condemned as
that failure to sustain the arms supply to Nigeria would be interpreted
59 Enahoro Back with Message for Gowon, in: Daily Times, August 29, 1968, p. 12.
60 Anthony Enahoro Holds Talks with British Government Officials, in: Daily Sketch,
August 20, 1968, p. 1.
61 Enahoro Back with Message for Gowon, in: Daily Times, August 29, 1968, p. 12.
62 Ibidem.
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as support for the secessionists.63 Similar positive tone in support of
Gowon led federal government was echoed in Nigeria in the editorial
of Morning Post newspaper on November 11, 1968 as the newspaper
vilified some members of the British Parliament who criticized Nige-
ria’s war effort against Biafra.64
The paper expressed its displeasure about the call for international
peace keeping in Nigeria for effective monitoring of situation and
ceasefire by some members of the British parliament as an affront on
Nigeria’s sovereignty.65 The domestic support enjoyed by theNigerian
government through this paper coupled with that of America served
as the vindication of British strategy of arms supply and diplomacy. It
therefore follows that the reservation of some members of the British
Parliament did not represent the overall interests of the British popu-
lation. This position has been corroborated by Karen Smith when he
argues that only 700 people in Britain joined the march against arms
supply to Nigeria while only 2,000 of such signed the petition against
arms supply to the federal government in 1968.66 Since the Parliament
in any democratic society represents the citizenry, this argument re-
mains plausible and this explains the reason why the British govern-
ment refused to be intimidated by the call of these few members of
the Parliament to halt arms supply to Nigeria. As the call to halt arms
supply continued unabated, the legitimacy which the British govern-
ment enjoyed further spurred it to sustain its support for Nigeria. This
was demonstrated through a letter sent by the British Prime Minister,
HaroldWilson via a diplomatic channel of the British Embassy headed
by Sir David Hunt in Lagos in late November 1968.67
The British government in the letter declared its continued sup-
port for Nigeria and that the preservation of Nigeria as one indivisi-
ble entity remained the cardinal objective of Britain.68 As international
call for the inspection of genocide as claimed by the propaganda ma-
chinery mounted within and outside Britain intensified, the British
63 UK Should Not Stop Arms to Nigeria-Palmer, in: Morning Post, October 12, 1968,
p. 16.
64 International Peace Keeping Force for Nigeria?, in:Morning Post, November 11, 1968,
p. 11.
65 Ibidem.
66 See: SMITH.
67 Wilson Writes Gowon, in:Morning Post, December 1,1968, p. 16.
68 Ibidem.
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government in the face of its arms supply saw the need to further sus-
tain its unilateral diplomatic efforts in Nigeria through the initiative of
inspecting the extent of genocidal activities as claimed by
Biafra machinery against the Nigerian state. This necessitated the visit
of the former British Minister for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Arthur
Bottomley to Nigeria early December 1968 with the possibility of af-
firming or debunking the anti-Nigerian sentiments expressed by some
sections of the British public.69 It would be unreasonable to suggest
that the pressure which emanated from some members of the British
Parliament did not yield positive result. To an extent, the British gov-
ernment succumbed to this pressure because it realized that its quest
for the preservation of one indivisible Nigeria through arms supply
against secessionist tendencies can be achieved through diplomatic
strategy. It could be argued that this thinking of the British leadership
provided the meeting point that reconciled the contradictory disposi-
tion of the British decision makers and the Biafra protagonists in the
British Parliament.
This meeting point of the decision making machinery of Britain was
further demonstrated as the British government sent a powerful dele-
gation that comprised of two members of the British Parliament. The
members of the Parliament in this delegation comprised of Lord Fen-
ner Brockway and James Griffiths a former Colonial Secretary for pos-
sible ceasefire by December 1968.70 The delegation visited both Gen-
eral Gowon and Col. Ojukwu in Lagos and Umuahia while the details
of their discussions with both leaders were kept under wraps.71 The
zeal with which the delegation carried out its obligations further at-
tests to the shift in attitude of some members of the British Parliament
towards the federal government. They appeared to have toed the line
of the executive in London knowing full well that the preservation of
Nigeria as one entity will in the long run guaranteed the overall British
interests in Nigeria. This line of thinking on the part of the British lead-
ership was further given a boost as the British resolved that the solu-
tion to the Nigerian civil war rested largely on the parties to the war
and that British government would create the platform for meaningful
negotiation.72
69 Bottomley Here to Study the Nigerian Crisis, in:NewNigerian, December 3,1968, p. 1.
70 UKMPs to See Gowon, in: Daily Times, December 20, 1968, p. 16.
71 Ibidem.
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The British government through Lord Shepherd, BritishMinister for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the House of Lords pilloried
the divisive intervention of some European powers such as France and
Russia in the war without proffering lasting solution.73 This criticism
of the European powers by Shepherd came on the heels of the agree-
ment reached between Soviet representatives under the leadership of
Ambassador Dobrynin and United States representatives under the
leadership of Presidential Assistant, Henry Kissinger in Washington
on February 21, 1969 on the need to find a common ground on where
their interests lied in different parts of the globe.74 In order to create
the platform for peace, the British government ensured a neutralized
air strip for the purposes of supplying relief materials for the victims
of both sides while negotiation continued.75 It may not be out of place
to contend that the British were tactical in their submission about the
victims of the war. They were not unaware of the excruciating condi-
tions of the Ibos that were far more severe than that of Nigerians. In
order to give the strategic approach of the British some semblance of
gravitas, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson proposed a visit to
Nigeria by March 1969, but this was initially rejected by Lagos before
the Nigerian government succumbed to pressure of allowing Wilson
into the country on March 27, 1969.76
The visit of the Prime Minister was used as a platform of creating
friendly climate for negotiation as Wilson jettisoned the plan to stay
on board British naval ship named Fearless for the State House in Ma-
rina Lagos.77 This was very strategic on the part of the British govern-
ment as it provided the opportunities for robust diplomatic fraterniza-
tion that enhanced the British peace initiative. The diplomatic strategy
of the British government provided the springboard for Prime Min-
ister Wilson to convince General Gowon when he arrived Lagos as
he was able to persuade him on the need to open the channels for
72 Shepherd Tells UK House of Lords, in: Daily Times, February 26, 1969, p. 12.
73 Ibidem.
74 AVP RF, f. 0129. Memorandum of Conversation Between US Presidential Assistant,
Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US, Dobrynin on the 21st of February
1969, p. 1.
75 Shepherd Tells UK House of Lords, in: Daily Times, February 26, 1969, p. 12.
76 FAFOWORA, p. 107.
77 At Nigeria’s Request, Wilson’s Visit is Put Back One Day, in: Daily Times, March 19,
1969, p. 12.
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negotiation with Ojukwu.78 The British leader through his fact finding
mission in Nigeria was able to feel the degree of support enjoyed by
the federal government in its quest for the preservation of one Nigeria.
For instance, Lt. Commander Diette-Spiff, the Military Governor of
Rivers State and the leadership of Calabar, the capital of South-Eastern
state drew the attention of Mr. Wilson to the strategic importance of
preserving Nigeria against secessionist tendencies.79 It is expediently
germane to argue that the nature of domestic support enjoyed by the
Gowon led federal government would have changed the perception
of the British about the news of genocide committed by the federal
troops in the East. Though scholars like Ijoma disagree with this sub-
mission that genocidal activities did not take place in the East as they
argue that genocidal activities were carried out by the Nigerian troops
based on the views of observers and commentators.80 However, this
assertion has not been supported by convincing empirical data. This
lack of evidence has been buttressed by Karen Smith who postulates
that the federal government during the war yielded to pressure from
Britain to allow a team of international observers as the team, having
stayed in Nigeria for a long period did not find traces of genocide.81 It
must be stated that this lack of evidence does not exculpate the Nige-
rian troops from such allegations.
The visit further encouraged the British in their intensification for
diplomatic efforts by collaborating with Six-Man Committee set up by
the OAU. The search for peace took Wilson to Addis Ababa Ethiopia
after leaving Nigeria while at the same time extended an invitation
to Ojukwu for possible negotiation in any country in Africa.82 The re-
sponse of Ojukwu to Wilson’s invitation while the latter was in
Ethiopia through Biafra pirate radio was that his departure from
Biafra was impossible.83 This unpleasant response did not dissuade
the British from intensifying their diplomatic efforts towards achiev-
ing peace in Nigeria as Wilson briefed Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian
78 Wilson Ends Final Talks, in: New Nigerian, March 3, 1969, p. 1.
79 Ibidem.
80 OKORO, p. 94.
81 SMITH.
82 Ojukwu Turns Down Wilson’s Invitation, in: Daily Sketch, April 1, 1969, p. 1.
83 Wilson’s Second Note to Ojukwu, in: New Nigerian, April 2, 1969, p. 1.
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Emperor, comprehensively on his findings in Nigeria.84 It seems rea-
sonable to state that Ojukwu unpleasant response was not unconnect-
ed with the rousing reception given to Wilson by the federal govern-
ment coupled with the British resolve to continue their arms supply
to Nigeria. In the estimation of Biafra, such conclusion further put
the British under pressure as biased Umpire in the Nigerian war who
could not issue a modicum of threat in terms of cutting arms supply to
their ally, Nigeria the way the United States leadership demonstrated
this to the Israelis in 1969 during the latter’s perennial conflict with the
Arabs.85 Since the British line of thinking in terms of preserving Nige-
ria as one entity was consistent with that of the chunks of members of
OAU, it was natural for them to channel their peace initiative towards
a body that had greater stakes in the Nigerian war because disinte-
gration of Nigeria in the estimation of OAU was capable of having
reverberating effects in the continent.
The British leadership exploited to the fullest the official position
of OAU as it convinced the organization through Wilson’s report sub-
mitted to its Secretary General, Mr. Diallo Telli in Addis Ababa.86 It
was stated in the report that the supply of relief materials in the war
torn Eastern Nigeria was going on in accordance with the best global
practices.87 It is crystal clear that the visit of the British Prime Minis-
ter to Nigeria further convinced Britain about its unflinching support
for Nigeria as this further enabled her to disregard the propagandist
strategy adopted by Biafra on the issue of alleged genocidal activi-
ties carried out by the Nigerian troops.88 This position was echoed in
the report of Mr. Wilson concerning his visit to Nigeria to the British
House of Commons as he argued that the British government was con-
vinced beyond reasonable doubts about the intention of Nigerian gov-
ernment to give the Ibos the same rights and privileges as it had been
granting it to other Nigerians provided the secessionists were opened
to negotiations without prior conditions.89
84 Ibidem.
85 A Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon on Next Step in
the Middle-East- NSC Meeting Thursday, September 11, 1969, p. 2.
86 No Reply From Ojukwu to Wilson, in: Daily Times, April 2, 1969, p. 1.
87 Ibidem.
88 Wilson Reports Back to Commons, in:Morning Post, April 3, 1969, p. 1.
89 Ibidem.
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Some sections of the British press doubted this official stance of the
British government as this further propelled the British leadership to
embark on a campaign of re-orientation of the British public about
the Nigerian civil war.90 One of the strategies adopted by the British
government was the further assessment of the Nigerian situation af-
ter Wilson’s visit to Nigeria through the British High Commissioner
to Nigeria, Sir Leslie Glass who was mandated by London to monitor
effectively the developments in Nigeria after Mr. Wilson’s visit.91 The
monitoring of situation in Nigeria even after Wilson’s visit through
British diplomatic presence in Nigeria in the estimation of the political
leadership in Britain was the key to validating its position on the war
through re-orientation of the British public. This became necessary for
the political leadership in Britain because public support could en-
hance its two pillars of intervention inNigerian civil war, that is, diplo-
matic strategy and arms supply to Nigeria. This in the permutation of
the policy makers in London was capable of accelerating federal vic-
tory that in turn guaranteed over £200m investment in terms of oil
installations of Shell-B.P in Port Harcourt.92
Despite the stalemate which enveloped the diplomatic efforts of the
British, the military victory of the federal troops in December 1968
and the subsequent extension of peace to Gowon on January 12, 1970
by Biafra reflected the magnanimity of Nigeria even in victory. It must
be stated that this magnanimity was a product of British diplomatic
efforts which extracted committed from the Nigerian leadership on
the need to jettison vindictive disposition towards the Ibos in the post-
war Nigeria. The fulfilling of this commitment on the part of Nigeria
cannot be delinked from the diplomatic astuteness of the British who
in turn used their bureaucratic sagacity to espouse peace initiatives
that protected their economic interests in Nigeria.
Conclusion
The outbreak of the Nigerian civil war became a subject of different
interpretations by keen observers within and outside Africa. These in-
terpretations were products of the diverse interests which these ob-
90 Britain is Committed to Keep Nigeria United-Sir Leslie, in: Nigerian Observer, June
26, 1969, p. 16.
91 Ibidem.
92 ADENIRAN, Nigeria and Great Britain, p. 37.
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servers had in Nigeria. For the British, the determination to preserve
Nigeria as one indivisible entity was determined by their quest for
the protection of British economic interests in Nigeria. This explains
why the British exploited to the fullest the failure of the multilateral
intervention through the instrumentalities of the Commonwealth and
the OAU as this compelled Britain to intensify its strategy of interven-
tion in the war. The twin pillars of her intervention was the arms sup-
ply to the federal government as this strengthened the federal troops
against the secessionists whose tendencies were capable of balkaniz-
ing Nigeria. This balkanization was equally capable of putting the
British in an economic dilemma and the need to prevent these un-
certainties necessitated the intensification of arms supply. It must be
added that the British diplomatic masterstroke served as an alterna-
tive strategy that whittled the effects of arms supply against the seces-
sionists. This diplomatic masterstroke without any doubt was made
possible through the unilateral British peace initiatives that salvaged
the failure of multilateral diplomatic interventions in the Nigerian
civil war.
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